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CONTROL OVER ARMED FORCES
I
In the evolution of popular rule no question has been of
more vital significance than this: "Shall the army be subordinate to or independent of the representative government?"
A German scholar has said that the true test to determine the
'essential character of a state is to answer the question, "Whom
does th6 army obey?" When the doctrine of divine right was
in full flower on the continent of Europe, the sovereign considered the army as a personal tool, a dynastic possession. The
absolute control and indestructible fidelity of the army was
looked upon as one of autocracy's mightiest assets. It was a
personal heritage transmitted from father to son, from generation to generation. While in most of the European countries, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the doctrine of
divine right had lost its force, in Germany as late as 1914, the
Kaiser in a Proclamation to the Army of the East declared, "On
me as German Emperor the spirit of God has descended. I am
his Weapon, his Sword and his Viceregent."
A few years
before William II said, "The soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities, have welded together the German empire
-my confidence is placed in the army."
II
An examination of the governments of the world at the
time the Constitution of the United States was adopted will
disclose that in every country the power to declare war was
vested in the Executive branch. The framers of our Constitution desired to break away from the beaten path. They intended that the most popular and most representative body in
the new government they were establishing should have discretion in this all important matter. Madison summed up the
matter by saying, "The Constitution supposes what the history
of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the
branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it.
It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war
in the legislature."' Such is the status of this power from the
standpoint of constitutional theory.
1
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But as a matter of actual practice, the situation is entirely
different. It would be correct to generalize and say that in our
four foreign wars, Congress has only exercised the formal power
of legalizing war as a status after the President has created a
situation which has made the fact of war inevitable. 2 The reason for the failure of this attempt to vest in the broadly representative legislative branch the discretionary power of declaring is not to be found in any ambiguity in the formulation
of the constitutional provision. Article 1, section 8, clause 11, is
as concise and definite as it can be written. It reads, "Congress
shall have the power to declare war."
Our constitutional
practice has frustrated the theory and intent of the framers
because of the President's dominating position as director of
foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief of the army and navy.
Mfr. Gerry in the Constitutional Convention expressed the
orthodox view when he averred that he "never expected to hear
in a republic a motion to empower the executive alone to declare
war" 3 but suppose that power had been given. Can any one
who is familiar with our history contend that we would have
had any more or any less foreign wars, if the power of declaring
war had been specifically vested in the executive branch? The
attempt on the part of the framers to clog rather than facilitate
the declaration of war has been a signal failure. By virtue of
the growth of Presidential power the executive so manages the
diplomatic affairs that Congress can do no more and no less
than to occupy the position that the President has put the
country into. Our legislative body, in respect to the important
power of declaring war, has virtually been reduced to a legitimizing agency, subservient to the President, deprived of
initiative and discretion. Its only function is to clothe a de
facto situation with de jure habiliments and thus give it re4
spectability.
III
The Constitution of the United States in article 2, section
2, clause 1, that "The.President shall be commander-in-chief
2For detailed discussion of this point see the author's article,
"The Declaration of War," in 61 American Law Review 410 )1921).
'Journal of Constitutional Convention-Hunt Edition 11, 188.
4 See author's article "The Theory of the War Power Under the
Constitution", 60 American Law Review 31.
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of the army and navy of the United States when called into the
actual service of the United States." What is the nature and
extent of this power ?
First, it should be noted that there are no express limitations on the President's power as commander-in-chief of the
army and navy. But although the framers of the Constitution
gave the President this apparently unlimited power, they gave
him no army and navy to command. For that he must come
to Congress. 5
Second, with refeience to the militia of the several states
the Constitution expressly limits the President's command in
several respects. (a) He has command of the militia only
"when called into the actual service of the United States.'' 6 In
McCall's case a United States District Court declared that
"whether a man is lawfully in military service must always be
a judicial question. It is peculiarly a question for decision
under habeas corpus."' 7 (b) The President cannot, upon his
own authority, order the militia into the "actual service of the
8
United States." That power is expressly given to Congress.
(c) Moreover, when the militia is in "the actual service of the
United States," the President is limited in the purposes for
which he may use the said militia. Article 1, section 8, clause
15, provides that Congress can call forth the militia for three
purposes: "to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection and to repel invasion."
Third-It follows as a corollary from what has been said
that the President is not commander-in-chief of the citizens of
the United States, not in the army, navy or organized militia.
Fourth-No President has ever assumed actual personal
command in the field.
IV
The Constitution contemplates a dual control and a restricted use of the militia. Elihu Root, in his report as Secretary of War declared that "the relations of the militia to the
federal government have never been defined or settled.'' 9 At
'Art. I See. 8. Clauses 12 and 13.
'Art. 2, Sec. 2. Clause 1.
715 Federal Cases 1225-1231.
Art. 1 Sec. 8. Clause 15.
'Annual Report of Secretary of War 1899-1903; p. 283.
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one time the vital issue was, which government shall decide who
shall be included in the militia? A state court finally passed
upon this ambiguity and decided that Congress had exclusive
power to determine who shall compose the militia. 10 At another
time the question was foremost, who determines whether an
"insurrection" or "invasion" exists, the states or the federal
government? The Supreme Court of the United States in
Martin v. Mott decided that the federal government had the
power to make this determination."
In an early case Justice Story said, "It is almost too plain
for argument that the power given to Congress over the militia
is of a limited nature.12 The very wording of the provision indictates that the militia is not to be used outside the country."
"Insurrections" and "invasions" naturally refer to internal
disorders and the "laws of the Union" have no extraterritorial
effect. 1 3 Woodrow Wilson in four speeches delivered in January and February, 1916, at New York, Cleveland, Omaha and
Topeka stated that the militia could not be sent out of the
country. But the Conscription Act of May 18, 1917, provided
for the drafting of the National Guard into the "military
service of the United States." It may be argued that the
militia as such was not sent outside of the United States, because
of the change in nomenclature resulting from the Congressional
act.
V
The power of Congress to raise and support armies is expressly conferred by Article 1, section 8, clause 12. This grant
of power is limited expressly by the provision that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than
two years." This obviously is an attempt to provide a democratic control over the army. It will be of little avail, however,
unless the right of Congress to discuss the aims and objects of a
war is recognized while the war is in progress.
Does Congress have an unlimited choice of means in the
"0Opinions of the Justices 80 Mass. 614 (1858).
12 Wheaton 19, 29.
" Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton 51.
ISSee Pomeroy, Constitutional Law p. 387; 29 Opinions of Attorney
General p. 322-324; Upton, Military Policy of U. S. 196-197; Von Holst
Constitutional Law p. 107; Ordonaux--Constitutional Legislation in
the United States 501-502; Leonard Wood, Our Military History 63-64.
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carrying out of this grant of power? When read in the light of
English history and in connection with the militia clauses it
would seem that the power conferred upon Congress was the
power to raise armies by the ordinary English method of voluntary enlistment. The use of money is the only instrumentality provided for that purpose.1 4 But the Supreme Court
of the United States has held otherwise. 15
VI
Although the attempt of the framers of the Constitution
to provide a democratic control over the army has not been
wholly successful, let it be said to their credit that they have
made a remarkable contribution toward that end. The reader
should refer to several cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States that stand out as landmarks in the great
struggle against arbitrary power: ex Parte Milligan, 4 Vallace 2; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 115; United States v.
Lee, 106 U. S. 196. There should be no room in American constitutional law for the dogma, "Inter arma silent leges," or the
doctrine of executive prerogative. The "war power" and the
President's power as commander-in-chief, when rightly understood, are constitutional powers. The advocates of unlimited
power in war-time have failed to glean from the pages of history
that the strict subordination of the military to the civil power
is at the foundation of freedom and that the first object of a free
people is the preservation of their liberty, and that under a
constitutional system such as ours liberty can be preserved, not
by a blind reliance on the benevolence of temporary majorities
in power, but by effectively maintaining constitutional
restraints.
FORREST REVERE BLACK,
Professor of Law.
University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Ky.

"Speech of Senator Hardwick, Hearing before Senate Committee
on Military Affairs; 65 Congress 1 Session, Sept. 27, 1917 p. 6.
'$Selective Draft Cases 245 U. S. 366-See author's article, Conscription for Foreign Service 60 American Law Review p. 206.

